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FACT SKEPTICISM AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS
Roger J. Traynort
When Jerome Frank made his devastating analysis of fact-finding
processes in Courts on Trial, it was high time to smash some icons.
I-e proved an effective iconoclast. He checked the jargon of. the law
against what he saw with his own eyes and recorded his shock at the
haphazardness of our hallowed ways. His bold irreverence stirred
many a lawyer into a painful awareness of how inadequate are the
accepted processes for eliciting facts. No one can now think of factfinding without immediately teing troubled by visions of ancient jousts
or of litigants weighed on scales. His forceful thinking has done much
to overcome the force of habit that binds men to ancient ways, however
superstitious their origin and however irrational their perpetuation.
It is heartening that so many now stand ready to mend these
ways. The question now is how. Perhaps the most effective way to
advance upon that question is through interchange of the ideas and
experience of professors, judges, and lawyers as at the recent roundtable of the Association of American Law Schools,1 organized to discuss
t Associate Justice, Supreme Court of California.
This paper was first presented at the Jurisprudence Round Table on Jerome
.1.

Frank's Fact Skepticism, sponsored by the Association of American Law Schools
as a memorial to Judge Frank at its meeting in San Francisco, December 29, 1957.
It is an apercu rather than an exhaustive study, in conformance with a fifteenminute time limitation and the prescriptions that "fact skepticism" be defined in
terms of the main themes of Judge Frank's book, Courts on Trial, and that each
addrcss at the Round Table "(a) Give one or more examples of the way the sub-.
stantive rules in a specific field of law already reflect 'Fact Skepticism,' and (b) give
one or more examples of the way the substantive rules in the same field might profit.

ably be changed to reflect the insights of 'Fact Skepticism."'
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various aspects of Jerome Frank's fact skepticism. Perhaps in time
such mcetings will lead to concrete revisions.
rhe problem is that the facts are forever gone and no scientific
method of inquiry can ever be devised to produce facsimiles that bring

the past to life. The judicial process deals with probabilities, not facts,
and we must therefore be on guard against making fact skepticism our
main preoccupation. However skillfully, however sensitively we arrarge a reproduction of the past, the arrangement is still that of the
theater. We acknowledge as much when we speak of re-enacting the
crime or the accident or perhaps some everyday event; we know better
than to speak of reliving it. The most we can hope for is that witnesses
will )e honest and reasonably accurate in their perception and recollection, that triers of fact will be honest and intelligent in their reasoning,
and that appellate courts will frame opinions with enough perspective
to guide others in comparable fact situations and preclude their disputes
from festering into litigation. As Max Radin 2 and Edmund Cahn "
have reminded us, our objective should be a settlement of present controversies that will restore litigants to normal living much as a hospital
restores the ailing and the injured.
Once we recognize perfect fact reproduction as an illusion, however., it does not follow that gross imperfections in our so-called factfinding processes are a necessity. Still we should regard any a priori
conclusions, including Jerome Frank's, with his very skepticism; we
gain nothing by generalizing frQm insufficient data. Objective studies
such as the jury project now under way at the University of Chicago
should yield new insights as to how rational our present processes are.
More light on the motives, methods, and reasoning of triers of fact
should help us to know whether fact determinations for the most part
emerge in an aura of conscientious and intelligent appraisal.
But can we ever learn enough when triers of fact do not articulate
the reasons for their determinations? Ideally they should inform the
losing litigant why he lost, why he is now to be deprived of his property*
or liberty or even life, what the specific facts were that determined his
case. A litigant who lost on X would then no longer speculate vainly
on why he lost. He might be able to show that X was an irrelevant,
fact, or perhaps an unsupported conclusion representing the trier's
fireside justice.
At present, in trials before a court sitting without a jury, the
findings frequently no more disclose the basis of decision than would.
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2. RADIN, LAW AS LoGIc AND Exvautc 62, 78, 95, 146 (1940).
3. Cahn, Book Review, 59 YAL L.J. 809, 810-11 (1950).
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a general jury verdict. Why is there such reluctance in the trial court
to reveal the actual basis of decision? Why do trial judges so frequently
adopt general, all-inclusive, or conclusionary findings prepared by
winning counsel? Arc they too busy to articulate the actual basis of
their decisions? Are they intent on blocking avenues to reversal? Or
is it that losing counsel fail to make a challenge of proposed findings
4 that would compel a clean articulation of what was decided?
Special interrogatories in jury trials, as well as specific findings
in court trials, have the appearance of constructive reform. It would
seem to make sense that judges, and the lawyers on whose proposed
findings*they so largely rely, should be able and willing to draft special
interrogatories skillful enough to disclose the actual basis of decision.
The blunt reality is that they seldom do so. Thus, even though special
mterrogatories are permissible in California,' they are seldom used.
What accounts for the uneasiness about them? Is it that many trial
attorneys, preoccupied with results, are content with general verdicts on
some mathematical speculation that their chances of success are as good
or bctter when determination of a case reveals only the result and not
the basis therefor? Is it that they are loath to invest the time and
effort necessary to prepare searching interrogatories? Do they perhaps
feel that juries would adapt their answers to special interrogatories to
accord with a predetermined conclusion? Are they apprehensive that
more often than not such interrogatories would serve only to confuse
juries and become another fertile source of reversible error? Are they
skeptical of new opportunities for mystification because of the present
multitude of lunatic communications that pass as instructions from
judge to jury? Or do they possibly fear that insistence on fine articulation would create new rituals of magic words akin to the old forms of
action ?
The explanation of the present resistance to the articulation of
fact determinations may be some one or all of these reactions and
something more, a sense that perhaps the main problem in fact-finding
is not whether fact determinations emerge in an aura of conscientious
and intelligent appraisal, let alone whether they are articulated, but
whether the evidence is presented in an aura of full disclosure of whatever is reasonably relevant to intelligently stated issues.
Here actual practice has for so long been so lamentably short of the
ideal that there is widespread agreement that reform is long overdue.
Unfortunately there has been all too little will to bring it about, despite
the splendid groundwork of Professor Morgan and the American Law
4. CAL. COD CIV. Paoc. Am;K.

§ 624,625 (West 1955).
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Istitute in the Model Code of Evidence and the Commissioners on
Uniform Laws in their proposed Uniform Rules. Perhaps the recent
rapid development of pre-trial and discovery procedures, born of necessity to rescue courts from the welter of ever-mounting litigation, augurs
vell for other reforms.
Ve.should be mindful, however, that such reforms may sometimes
ironically do more harm than good unless there are attendant reforms
in substantive rules. At present, triers of fact can achieve a rough
justice by circumventing rules long out of tune with community values
while appearing to enforce them, letting legally irrelevant considerations
prevail over the facts presented or passively accepting an incomplete
presentation. The dilemma is that such circumvention corrupts factfinding.
"Perhaps in no other area has the discrepancy between law
in dogmatic theory and law in. action, evading dogma by fiction
and. subterfuge, become so marked as in divorce law. The
withered dogma that divorce can be granted only for marital
fault, variously and eccentrically defined from state to state, is
rendered still more irrational by the widespread rule that recrimination is an absolute defense. The result has been a triumph,
not for dogma, but for hypocrisy. Rules insensitive to reality
have been cynically circumvented by litigants and attorneys with
the tacit sanction of the courts.".6 ,-Such corruption can be dispellhd only by reforms that begin with the

substantive rules. More would be lost than gained by a reform of factfinding that would only compel righteous adherence to the wrong rules.
Likewise in personal injury law the geometric growth of litigation
has compelled scholars to re-examine substantive rules that are beginning to show cracks. For the most part they rest on the theory that
liability is based on fault. In our ultra-hazardous age, however, some
scholars are reasoning that this should give way in many areas to
strict liability. They observe that juries, responsive to the needs of
accident victims, may in fact impose liability without fault by adapting
to that end instructions on such fluid concepts as proximate cause,
nigligence, last-clear chance, res ipsa loquitur and the like.
If we are moving toward an expansion of strict liability, we should
do so openly, not by declarations of fictitious negligence or denials of
actual negligence. If we are not willing to do so openly, then of course
S. Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 lW.. LAw
FORUM 230, 236.
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fictions have a certain utility in circumventing unrealistic rules. But
why not do so openly and thereby impose uniform operation of the law?
Again, any reform should begin with substantive rules. Again, we
would lose more than wc would gain by a reform of fact-finding that
would only compel righteous adherence to wrong rules.
Whatever the drift toward strict liability in some areas, personal
injury cases nevertheless still turn in the main on an issue of actual
negligcnce. Sometimes, however, as in Sumntmers v. Tice,, it is im-*
11ossilile for the plaintiff to present enough evidence to establish that
it was more probable than not that the negligence of any one or more
of several defendants caused his injury, even though all were within
the ficld of causation. The court there held that both of two negligent
hunters could be held liable for plaintiff's injury, although the act of
only one could have been the cause. Concerned lest plaintiff be deprived
of a remedy against either hunter, it impaled them both by shifting the
burden of persuasion to them even though their mystification matched
that of plaintiff. In effect it ruled out the fact-question of causation,
thus obviating any occasion for fact skepticism.
At the other extreme, a court may be so imbued at the outset with
fact skepticism as to a conceivably provable fact that it arbitrarily
assumes so large a hazard of untrustworthiness in any evidence to
establish causation as to rule out any cause of action. Thus in cases
involving prenatal injuries or mental suffering, the courts have been
so concerned lest blameless defendants be subjected to liability that
they have until recently denied any remedy for such injuries, even
when the plaintiff was prepared to show a causal relation between the
defendant's conduct and the injury. They have made the fact of
causation irrelevant, not because of confidence that the defendant was
at least in the field of causation, but because of skepticism that he was
in it at all.
Courts as well as legislatures have sometimes also evinced a strong
fact skepticism in such formulas to preclude evidence as the Statute
of Frauds and the Parol Evidence Rule. Sometimes a moderate
skepticism has combined with a strongly entrenched public policy to
preclude evidence, as in the absolute privileges that attend the law of
defamation and other torts and in such conclusive presumptions, applied
with varying rigor, as the one that a child born to a married woman
is legitimate. In either event the risk of erroneous determinations of
fact has been so serious as to engender rules that preclude a litigant from
even attempting to prove his case.
6. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P2d 1 (1948).
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IL would clarify our thinking to realize that so-called ordinary
cases differ only in degree from these extreme cases where the uncertainty of the facts is so ovcrwhelming as to compel courts to dispense
with their litigation altogether. In certain areas they may be closer to
the extreme than we have customarily supposed. We might do well
to note those issues of fact that chronically engender litigation and
inquire whether the risk of erroneous determinations is so serious that
we should dispense with their litigation also. Salient among these is
the issue of fault in motor vehicle cases, now the main preoccupation
of trial courts. When cars collide with each other or with a pedestrian,
we ordinarily know who was driving and who was hurt, but how
accurately do we ascertain the facts beyond that? Can we accept with
any assurance conclusions as to causation that give no indication that
the triers of fact made a discriminating determination that the injury
was caused by negligent conduct when it is in a context of an otherwise
non-ncgligent activity? Even assuming that they are aware of the
neccssity of isolating negligent conduct from such a context, what
issurance do we have as to the rationality of the ad hoc standards of
care by which they measure conduct?
The thought pervades in these questions, as in those posed earlier,
that at least in some areas our first concern should be with the substantive rules. Of course we want rational fact-finding processes.
There can be little quarrel with the triple objective of conscientiods
and intelligent appraisal of the"evidence, a reasonably articulated explanation of why the losing party lost, and rules of evidence that facilitate disclosure of whatever is reasonably relevant to intelligently stated
issues. If we achieve these objectives without making attendant reforms in the substantive rules, however, we may accomplish too much
too carly. For given our chronic inertia, archaic rules might then
persist, immune in the glare of eminently sane processes from that
quiet distortion that presently adapts them to the needs of a rough
.
justice.
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